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ABSTRACT
With adaptive customer-orientation the efficiency of 
supply chain management is improved substantially. By the 
introduction of service quality-based decision-making into 
supply chain management the quality of service (QoS) with-
in supply chains is expected to improve autonomously and 
continuously up- and downstream. In the paper the main 
characteristics of quality of service oriented supply chain 
management are outlined. The quality of service criterion, 
introduced into the adaptive supply chain model, provides 
market regulators and managements with the needed in-
formation and feedback to their increasingly informed de-
cisions. By an experiment comprising several typical sce-
narios on our agent-based simulation model it was possible 
to empirically verify the expected impact of quality of ser-
vice-based reasoning on generic adaptive supply chains.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A supply chain (SC) can be seen as a complex 
adaptive system of interrelated and interdependent 
elements, which collaborate in executing different 
activities in order to achieve some preliminary set ob-
jectives. According to [1], a complex adaptive system 
is a system that evolves through time into a coherent 
whole that adjusts and self-organizes itself without any 
individual entity intentionally controlling or supervising 
it. Christopher [2] states that “the supply chain is a 
network of organizations working together in different 
processes and activities in order to bring products and 
services to the market, with the purpose of satisfying 
customer’s demands”. 
Decision-makers in supply chains are often faced 
with strategic decision-making challenges with only 
partial information on the system structure and/or 
system operation. Hence, the adopted decisions may 
have a negative impact on overall supply chain per-
formance. These situations should be avoided and 
can be prevented by utilizing decision support tools 
(DST). DSTs enable business and/or organizational 
decision-making based on rapidly changing data not 
known in advance. Applying the holistic modelling ap-
proach to capture the extended supply chain at a stra-
tegic level of an enterprise within a DST may be the 
solution to our decision-making problem [3]. 
As a network of organizations, the SC is obliged to 
have clearly defined objectives. The main objective of 
the supply chain is the maximization of total profits 
derived across different echelons of the supply chain. 
The second most important objective, however, is the 
maximization of customer satisfaction, expressed by 
the service level [4], also referred to as quality of ser-
vice (QoS). While the majority of DST-based approach-
es deal with the first objective, the fulfilment of the 
second objective, in our opinion, is interrelated with it 
and as such should be considered in conjunction [5]. 
The set goals can only be attained by adequate supply 
chain configuration and proper use of management 
tools. The latter are provided by supply chain man-
agement (SCM), being the process of planning, imple-
menting and controlling the operations of the supply 
chain in an efficient way. SCM spans all movements 
and storage of raw materials, work-in-process inven-
tory, and finished goods from the point of origin to the 
point of consumption [6]. 
SCM addresses a wide range of problems, which 
may be divided into three categories [7]: 
 – supply chain infrastructure (network) design, 
 – supply chain analysis and policy formulation, 
 – supply chain planning and scheduling.
Within the process of modelling and solving the in-
dicated problems, managers have to make decisions 
on different hierarchical levels. These decisions can 
be classified as strategic, tactical and operational, de-
pending on their effects on the overall supply chain. 
Due to interdependence among the three levels, SCM 
remains incapable of satisfactorily addressing many 
practical real-world problems at a strategic level. Let 
alone that these levels are difficult to tackle at any 
individual level, due to inter-dependencies among en-
tities and their autonomous behaviour they are even 
more difficult to address. Hence, the majority of mod-
elling approaches in DST provide invalid results [8]. 
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throughout supply chains in order to assure an ade-
quate level of quality of products and/or services of-
fered. Products or services of lower quality are dep-
recated, since they result in lowering partner’s wealth 
and usually also result in the loss of trust. Hence, the 
tendency is to build trusted relations among supply 
chain partners, usually resulting in contract relation-
ships. We may conclude that the market partly regu-
lates itself; for the other part, however, market regula-
tors are necessary to restrain bad business practices. 
Prior to any transaction between supply chain part-
ners the corresponding probe is evaluated based on 
the provided values for the individual partner’s QoS 
and price. With each transaction the partner’s QoS val-
ue is updated and stored for later reference. The gath-
ered data are used for monitoring and analysis of sup-
ply chain excellence represented by the mean value of 
all partner’s QoS values. In order for this benchmark to 
be meaningful, all the measured values must lie within 
a predefined threshold. Hence, all QoS indicators are 
normalized and joined in a single value [5], represent-
ing QoS of any distinct node in the supply chain. It shall 
be used to enable quick decisions and comparison 
among supply chains by their partners. By construct-
ing and embedding a QoS-based agent based simula-
tion model in a DST system, closed loop analysis and 
performing “what-if” scenarios are enabled to assist 
the decision-makers at supply chain nodes with their 
informed SCM decisions. 
3. QoS-ORIENTED SC ABS MODEL 
Since business relations are essentially about ob-
taining and maintaining supply chain partner’s wealth, 
in this research the effect of good and bad business 
practices is reflected by positive and negative finan-
cial stimuli. Market regulators in the form of inspectors 
are introduced into the model to monitor the state of 
trustfulness (QoS) of supply chain partners. An agent-
based simulation model has been devised to monitor 
the overall QoS within a supply chain, based on the 
given initial number of producers, retailers and market 
regulators as well as the parameters that represent 
the market regulation policy. By different scenarios the 
most efficient distribution of contractual and non-con-
tractual partners as well as market regulation policy 
can be discovered. Since the geographical distribution 
of the producers and retailers in space is unknown, it 
is assumed to be random. Hence, also their position-
ing does not affect their pricing policies in any way. 
3.1 Model overview 
The framework of the model consists of three 
agent types: (1) producer agents, (2) retailer agents, 
(3) regulator agents.
For obtaining adequate solutions at the strategic level, 
decision-makers need comprehensive models to guide 
them in the decision-making process. 
System dynamics (SD), being a simulation-based 
modelling approach, which underpins DST and holistic 
modelling [8, 9], is widely used in logistics and sup-
ply chain management. On the other hand, SD-based 
models are mainly applicable in situations where the 
type of flow elements can be unified (e.g. on transac-
tion level) and the type and behaviour of their manipu-
lation entities (supply chain nodes) do not change over 
time, and as such impose no further restrictions to the 
simulation [10, 11]. In case the behaviour of the mod-
elled system depends on decisions and interactions 
among heterogeneous entities, the agent-based simu-
lation (ABS), an over-set of SD, approach to modelling 
and simulation of such systems should be used [12, 
13]. 
Here, an ABS-based model of a multi-echelon sup-
ply chain, which may be used to analyse and fine tune 
the behaviour of supply chain nodes, is presented. The 
layout of this paper is as follows. First, the SCM mod-
el and its integration into an ABS model is presented. 
Next, the ABS model for a generic supply chain is pre-
sented with the demonstration of the node behaviours 
according to the selected strategy. Finally, the results 
of different simulation scenarios are analysed and a 
conclusion on the outcomes is drawn. 
2. QoS-ORIENTED SCM 
Our supply chain evaluation method is based on 
the adaptable (customer-led) supply chain model and 
considers the supply chain as a composition of part-
ners, fulfilling the customer-supplier relationship [5]. 
QoS-probes are inserted on every link among any two 
elements fulfilling this relation. Hereby, service quality 
is observed between producers and their suppliers of 
materials and components, producers and retailers of 
their products, as well as customers and retailers. Any 
input transaction on a link represents a response to a 
call for proposals and has two properties – price and 
QoS value – that are considered by a customer when 
deciding on the acceptance or refusal of a supplier’s 
proposal. Usually, the decision is made solely based 
on price, where the lowest price is considered the best 
offer. However, due to often questionable QoS of such 
offers, this decision is not always the best one. Hence, 
customers usually rely on a (set of) trusted supplier(s) 
with whom they establish contract relationships that 
are considered a priority above the price criterion. This 
criterion is QoS-related and represents a level of trust 
between a customer and their supplier. 
The QoS value is calculated based on the given 
model to determine whether an entity should estab-
lish or disrupt the contract relationships with its sup-
pliers. Market regulators intervene with inspections 
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( )QoS d QoS d QoS1 mint t1 $ $= - ++ + +  (1)
( )QoS d QoS QoS1 mint t1 $= - ++ -  (2)
where QoSt represents the value of QoS after t transac-
tions. A value of QoS close to 0 represents the fact that 
the producer is prone to cheating. The QoS value clos-
er to 1 represents the producer’s tendency to be trust-
worthy. Parameters d+ and d− where (0<d+<1, 0<d−<1, 
d−>d+) are impact factors of positive and negative 
experience, respectively. The parameter QoSmin rep-
resents a minimal level of trust, where (0<QoSmin<1) 
and is initially set to 0.1. If the producer is not found 
cheating, its new QoS value is calculated according 
to (1); otherwise the new value is calculated accord-
ing to (2). The updating of the producer’s experience 
and hence the decision on the investment into a 
trustworthy production is simplified. It is based on the 
assumption that the most recent experience has the 
stronger influence, representing the short memory ef-
fect. It is also influenced by the fact that a negative 
experience has a stronger influence than a positive ex-
perience, representing the endowment effect. 
The producer sells its products to the retailers after 
production, and makes a profit that equals the total 
revenue minus total cost, where the revenue is the 
sales revenue from the market, and the cost includes 
the production cost and a fine, if producer’s distrustful-
ness is detected. Furthermore, the profit changes the 
producer’s wealth. We assume a uniform transaction 
price (p1) produced with the realisation of the transac-
tion between a producer and a retailer: 
( ) ( ) ( ), ( )~ ( , )p t cs cl t t N11 2fm m f n v= + +-  (3)
where cs is the cost of trusted production for a non-con-
tract producer, cl is the cost of distrusted production 
and ε(t) is a random real number following normal 
distribution, which reflects fluctuations on the market, 
and λ is a weight set in the interval (0,1), representing 
market flexibility. 
The producer’s decision on trustworthy production 
depends mainly on three parameters: economic ben-
efits comparison, random factors and current level of 
trustfulness. The following formula expresses this pro-
duction decision:  
( )k QoSp1 >i tm m+ -  (4)
If this inequality is satisfied, the producer ships 
a certain number of products in an inadequate way, 
hereby reducing its QoS by QoSmin. Otherwise, the pro-
ducer ships a certain number of products in an ade-
quate way, hereby increasing its QoS by QoSmin. Here ρ 
is a random number (0<ρ<1); ki is a normalized value, 
which is given based on the gap between the expected 
returns by trusted production, which is chosen in two 
ways based on the fact whether one is a non-contrac-
tual producer (5) or contractual producer (6): 
There are n producers in a product production 
base, and each producer produces s units of a prod-
uct. At a wholesale market, there are m retailers that 
deal with the producers. There are x regulator agents 
who perform inspections on producers and retailers. 
The behaviours of different types of agents are further 
described below. 
Considering the trust-related credence attributes 
between customers and suppliers, there is a prob-
lem of information asymmetry, since they cannot be 
directly observed and are difficult to measure. The pro-
ducers can be trusted or distrusted and it depends on 
their decision regarding their quality of service (QoS). 
In our supply chain model, non-contractual retailers 
make transactions with non-contractual producers 
stochastically. Contractual retailers make transactions 
with contractual producers building fixed transaction 
relationships. Contractual modes are trust-related and 
can be switched under certain circumstances. Produc-
ers’ and retailers’ trustfulness is monitored by the reg-
ulator agents who issue fines in case of inadequate 
business practices are detected. 
3.2 Regulator-agent 
In the model, the regulator agents are several mar-
ket regulator’s departments which supervise different 
parts of the supply chain. Here, for simplicity reasons, 
two types of regulator agents are assumed, one for the 
producers and another for retailers, respectively. The 
goal of the market regulators is to improve the service 
quality within the supply chain by means of sampling 
inspection and punishment under certain conditions. 
The goal of the retailers is to maintain contract rela-
tionships with trusted producers only. There are differ-
ent inspecting ratios for producers Θ1 and retailers Θ2. 
α is the frequency of product inspections. The fine on 
producers is f1, and the fine on retailers is f2. They are 
understood per product shipped or product sold. 
3.3 Producer-agent 
A producer produces a number of products and 
sells them to one of the retailers. The producer’s goal 
is to maximize its profit. The attributes of a producer 
are producer’s type (contractual or non-contractual), 
trustfulness, wealth, and transformational threshold. 
The producer’s trustfulness level (QoS) indicates 
its ability to resist the shock of benefit produced by the 
gap between expected returns of trusted and distrust-
ed production. The decision on trustfulness is built 
into the model as a function of producers’ experience. 
With every transaction the producer gains experience 
with regard to its benefit or loss, in case that during 
inspection its inadequate business practice was de-
tected. The following formulas show quality of service 
updating as a function of producer’s experience under 
different situations: 
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Considering the learning capacity in this model, the 
producers can learn and imitate from each other. If the 
non-contract producer’s profit is less than the average 
profit of its neighbours, who are contract producers, it 
would transform into a contract producer under cer-
tain conditions. Otherwise, its type remains the same. 
The contract producer is in a similar situation. If the 
contract producer’s profit is less than the average prof-
it of its neighbours, who are non-contract producers, 
the contract producer would transform into a non-con-
tract producer under certain conditions. Otherwise, 
the contract producer would sustain its contracts with 
its retailers. 
Different types of producers usually coexist simul-
taneously in a simulation run. Prior to transformation 
any producer needs to take into account the financial 
consequences of its transformation. When the dif-
ference between the benefits and costs of the trans-
formation exceeds threshold (γ) the producer would 
change from one type to another. Otherwise, its type 









- + -^ h  (7)
where pii is producer(i)’s profit, pi’i is the average profit 
of its neighbours who are a different type of produc-
ers, parameter λ is a weight set in the interval (0,1); 
parameter ρ is a random number (0<ρ<1) and reflects 
fluctuations in the market. 
Each producer has its own transforming thresh-
old that implies producers’ adaptability to the envi-
ronment, production decision regarding its QoS and 
experience gained by it. The producer’s transforming 
threshold updates with every transaction: 
a) γt+1=γt(1−QoSt)+γt; if the producer is not fined; 
b) γt+1=γt(1−QoSt); if the producer is fined. 
3.4 Retailer-agent 
A retailer purchases products from producers in 
different ways, and sells them on to those downstream 
customers in the supply chain. The retailer’s goal is to 
gain more profit. The attributes of a retailer are con-
tract status (non-contracted or contracted), wealth 
value, and transforming threshold. The behaviour of a 
retailer follows the rules described below. 
The retailer sells the products to the downstream 
of supply chain after purchase, and makes a prof-
it that equals the total revenue minus the total cost, 
where revenue represents sales revenue from the 
market, and the cost the purchasing cost plus the fine 
deposit. Furthermore, the profit makes the retailer’s 
wealth changing. We assume that each retailer sells 
all products, regardless of the type of producers, and 
that there is a uniform transaction cost (p2) produced 
when the transition between the retailer and the down-
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where c’s is the cost of trusted production for a con-
tractual producer, f3 is a fine deposit made by contract 
producers to the retailers for any product sold. 
Each producer can decide whether to make a con-
tract with a retailer. If a producer makes a contract 
with a retailer, the producer will become a contract pro-
ducer, and vice versa. The non-contract producers sell 
their products to the nearest non-contract retailers. 
Any producer with non-trustworthy production is fined, 
if the producer is inspected. The contract producers 
sell their products to the retailers who have contracts 
with them. The contract producer’s fine mainly derives 
from two aspects: inspections and investigating and 
tracing of its contractual retailers. It is assumed that 
the contract retailers can find and fine their distrusted 
contract producers easily. For s products sold the pro-
ducers’ profits are calculated as follows.
Non-contract producers
a) pi1=s(p1−cl), when the producer is distrusted and 
is not inspected; 
b) pi2=s(p1−cl−f1), when the producer is distrusted 
and fails to pass the inspection; 
c) pi3=s(p1−cs), when the producer is trusted.
Contract producers
 – When the producer is distrusted and the trans-
action price between the producer and retailer is 
more than minimum protective price (p1≥pr), the 
profit is: 
a) pi1=s(p1−cl), if the producer is not fined; 
b) pi2= s(p1−cl−f1), if the producer does not pass the 
inspection conducted by the market regulator; 
c) pi3=s(p1−cl−f3), if the producer is fined by one’s 
own contract retailer; 
d) pi4=s(p1−cl−f1−f3), if the producer is fined by the 
market regulator and its contract retailer. 
 – When the producer is trusted and (p1≥pr), the profit 
is pi5=s(p1−c’s).
 – When the producer is distrusted and (p1<pr), the 
profit is: 
a) pi6=s(pr−cl), if the producer is not fined; 
b) pi7=s(pr−cl−f1), if the producer does not pass the 
inspection conducted by the market regulator; 
c) pi8=s(pr−cl−f3), if the producer is fined by its con-
tract retailer; 
d) pi9=s(pr−cl−f1−f3), if the producer is fined by the 
market regulator and the contract retailer. 
 – When the producer’s production is trusted and 
(p1<pr), the profit is: pi10=s(pr−c’s). 
Gumzej R, Rosi B. An Agent-based Simulation of a QoS-oriented Supply Chain
Promet – Traffic&Transportation, Vol. 29, 2017, No. 6, 593-601 597
contract status would remain the same. The contract 
retailer is in a similar situation and would transform 
into a non-contract retailer under certain conditions.
Different types of retailers usually coexist simulta-
neously in a simulation run. Prior to transformation any 
retailer needs to take into account the financial con-
sequences of its transformation. When the difference 
between the benefits and costs of the transformation 
exceeds threshold (ν) the retailer would change from 
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where rii is retailer(i)’s profit, and ri’i is the average 
profit of the retailers who are of different type, param-
eter λ is a weight set in the interval (0,1), parameter ρ 
is a random number (0<ρ<1) and reflects fluctuations 
on the market. 
Each retailer has its own transforming thresh-
old that implies retailers’ adaptability to the environ-
ment, sales decision regarding its QoS and experience 
gained by it. The retailer’s transforming threshold up-
dates with every transaction: 
a) νt+1=v(1−QoSt)+νt; if the seller is not fined; 
b) νt+1=νt(1−QoSt); if the seller is fined. 
4. DISCUSSION
The simulation model was developed and tested 
with NetLogo 5.3.1 [14]. Our simulation model ap-
plies to generic supply chains of partners fulfilling 
the supplier-customer relationship. We have focused 
on producers of final products and retailers of these 
products, who sell them to end-customers. Our goal 
was to study the introduction of QoS into the supply 
chain management. In our case QoS represents sup-
ply chain partner’s trustfulness as a gradual quantita-
tive indicator that changes (improves or deteriorates) 
with each transaction. The results of this oscillations 
are considered as a benefit or hazard when making 
any business deal and when considering contract rela-
tionship transitions between business partners. 
With our model, we have been able to evaluate the 
combined impact of a number of contractual and/or 
non-contractual producers and retailers on the mar-
ket, who are inspected by a number of market regu-
lators with the given inspection frequencies and dif-
ferent fines on non-trustworthy business practices of 
producers and/or retailers. Hereby, we also observed 
the fluctuations on the market, regarding the number 
of contractual relations, dynamics of QoS changes and 
qualified rate of trustful partners’ changes. 
The main answers that we wished to obtain from 
our simulation-based DST are: 
 – How does the introduction of QoS impact our market? 
 – How do fines affect our market? 
( ) ( ) ( )p t p t 12 1 d= +  (8)
where parameter δ represents the extra ratio between 
wholesale price and market price and is a real number 
from the interval (0,1). p2 fluctuates according to p1 on 
a certain scale. 
When contract retailers make a contract with con-
tract producers they provide a minimum protective 
price (pr). When market price p1 is higher than the 
protective price, the purchasing price fluctuates along 
with the market changes; when market price p1 is 
lower than the protective price, the purchasing price 
becomes the protective price. The retailer’s profits are 
calculated as given below, where bs denotes the num-
bers of products sold. 
Non-contract retailer
 – When the retailer is not inspected by the market regula-
tor, the profit is: ri1=bs(p2−p1). 
 – When the retailer does not pass the inspection, the profit 
is: ri2=bs(p2−p1−f2). 
Contract retailer
 – When p1≥pr, the profit is: 
a) ri1=bs(p2−p1), if the retailer is not fined; 
b) ri2=bs(p2−p1−f2)−ci+sqf3, if the retailer is fined by 
the market regulator; 
 – When p1<pr, the profit is: 
a) ri3=bs(p2−pr), if the retailer is not fined; 
b) ri4=bs(p2−pr−f2)−ci+sqf3, if the retailer is fined by 
the market regulator. 
where q is the number of contract producers who are 
inspected by their contract retailers as a consequence 
of them being fined by the market regulator. 
For the non-contract retailers, there is no way to 
find out about distrusted producers, if they fail the 
inspection, because they stochastically interact with 
some of a large number of small-scale producers on 
the market. Consequently, the non-contract retailers 
alone have to bear the fine from the market regulator. 
On the other hand, the contract retailers can find those 
distrusted producers, if they fail inspection, by several 
means (such as traceability system, field management 
and/or certification). When a contract retailer is fined, 
it would conduct an investigation about the distrust-
ed producers at cost (ci), and punish those contract 
producers. Their punishment is a fine in the form of a 
deposit (f3) that the contract producers had paid in ad-
vance. Contract retailers build up stable interaction re-
lationships with their producers. Moreover, their trust 
is strengthened with every solid transaction, resulting 
in their rising QoS. 
In this model, the two types of retailers can learn 
and imitate from each other. When the non-contract 
retailer’s profit is less than the average profit of the 
contract retailers, it would transform into a con-
tract retailer under certain conditions. Otherwise, its 
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We have defined four characteristic scenarios for 
our experiment. They differ in the numbers of market 
regulator’s inspectors, producer’s fine per product, re-
tailer’s fine per product, inspection ratio for producers 
and inspection ratio for retailers. The final results from 
performing 10 replications of each individual scenario 
are summarised in Table 1. They present the achieved 
contract production ratio (C/P), maximum average 
QoS (QoS) and maximum qualified rate (QR) by inspec-
tions. In the sequel the individual scenarios are briefly 
presented. The figures with the scenario descriptions 
show the changes in time of the average QoS and QR 
rates by typical simulation runs for each scenario.
The first scenario (see Table 1) presents a free 
market with no contractual relationships, few market 
regulators, low inspection frequency and low fines for 
distrustful operation. From the results we can deduce 
that around 70% of our market has reached at least 
an average QoS of 58%. Figures 1a and 1b show that 
although the QoS has reached a stable value, there 
are considerable deviations in the QR, resulting from 
the fact that this was a free market.
The second scenario (see Table 1) presents a mixed 
market with many market regulators, low inspection 
frequency and low fines for distrustful operation. 
From the results we can deduce that around 70% of 
our market has reached at least the average QoS of 
58%. The probability of ending up with a fully regulated 
market in this case was 0.4. As opposed to Figure 1b 
we can observe in Figure 2b that the presence of con-
tract relations somehow regulated the QR; however, al-
though the number of market regulators was doubled, 
the achieved QoS was not higher.
 – How does the ratio (frequency) of inspections af-
fect our market? 
 – By which combination of measures can we obtain 
a higher qualified rate of business partners’ QoS? 
 – By which combination of measures can we reach 
a situation in which the market is totally regulated 
(all partners are trustworthy contract partners)? 
The input variables of our simulation are: 
 – the number of producers, 
 – the number of retailers, 
 – the number of inspectors, 
 – the producer’s fine per product, 
 – the retailer’s fine per product, 
 – the fine deposit by contracted producers, 
 – the inspection ratio for producers, 
 – the inspection ratio for retailers, 
 – the flexibility of market λ,
 – the ratio between wholesale price and market price δ. 
There were 50 producers and 5 retailers included 
in our experiment. In order to achieve unified and sta-
ble conditions, λ and δ variables have been set to 0.5. 
As any producer, every retailer also has its own trans-
forming threshold with initial values of 0.1 and 0.2, re-
spectively. The products are unified in production price 
at 1 (100%) where the additional overhead cost of 
trustful production is set to 50% for non-contract pro-
ducers and 40% for contract producers. Fines are con-
sidered as ratios, according to production/wholesale 
price and are also unified as additions to the original 
price. The price for investigating a distrustful contract 
producer, in case the retailer is fined, is set to 50% of 
the product price. The fine deposit by contracted pro-
ducers has been set to 55% of the product price.
Table 1 – Summary of simulation scenarios results
Input variable values Results after 100 transactions
1
5 market regulator’s inspectors, 
0.85 producer’s fine per product, 
1.2 retailer’s fine per product, 
0.31 inspection ratio for producers, 
0.3 inspection ratio for retailers. 
C/P: avg. 0; std. 0 
QoS: avg. 0.578; std. 0.02044
QR: avg. 0.695; std. 0.03837
2
10 market regulator’s inspectors, 
0.85 producer’s fine per product, 
1.2 retailer’s fine per product, 
0.31 inspection ratio for producers, 
0.3 inspection ratio for retailers. 
C/P: avg. 0.494; std. 0.521029
QoS: avg. 0.5798; std. 0.021311
QR: avg. 0.7037; std. 0.060802
3
10 market regulator’s inspectors, 
1.2 producer’s fine per product, 
2.4 retailer’s fine per product, 
0.51 inspection ratio for producers, 
0.6 inspection ratio for retailers. 
C/P: avg. 0.9; std. 0.316228
QoS: avg. 0.725; std. 0.019579
QR: avg. 0.887; std. 0.023594
4
5 market regulator’s inspectors, 
0.85 producer’s fine per product, 
1.2 retailer’s fine per product, 
0.51 inspection ratio for producers, 
0.6 inspection ratio for retailers. 
C/P: avg. 0.7; std. 0.483046
QoS: avg. 0.728; std. 0.016193
QR: avg. 0.85; std. 0.026247
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Figure 4 – Scenario 4
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they still compete on the market this value is never 
reached. In the rest of the cases we can observe the 
expected behaviour on a free or mixed market. 
Fines largely affect our market; however, they are 
not effective if the frequency of inspections is low, 
which may be associated with a low number of inspec-
tors. According to our results, we may say that the fre-
quencies of inspections have a bigger impact on the 
market than the height of fines. 
We may conclude that the market is largely affect-
ed by a combination of the following three parameters: 
number of inspectors, fines and inspection rates. In 
case they are high, we are likely to end up with a fully 
regulated market. Otherwise, it is more likely that we 
end up with a mixed or even free market.
5. CONCLUSION 
From our simulation results we can conclude that 
QoS is a good market regulation criterion – even on 
free markets the competition among non-contract 
partners renders an above-average overall QoS. Of 
course we may reach a higher QoS with contract part-
ners in case their choice is trustfulness. 
To maintain an elevated level of QoS, inspections 
are necessary to prevent bad business practices to 
prevail due to higher expected profits. On the other 
hand, market inspections only have a significant im-
pact on the model, in case they are frequent. High 
fines for distrustful business practices alone are not 
sufficient market regulators. 
We may sum up our conclusions with the following 
claim. In response to the thesis in [5] we may conclude 
that considering QoS in combination with the price 
criterion supports supply chain partners with their 
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SIMULACIJA AGENTOV NA QoS-ORIENTIRANE  
OSKRBOVALNE VERIGE
POVZETEK
Skozi adaptivnost in orientiranost na stranko bistveno 
izboljšamo učinkovitost upravljanja oskrbovalnih verig. Z 
uvajanjem odločanja na osnovi kakovosti storitve (QoS) v 
upravljanje oskrbovalnih verig pričakujemo avtonomno in 
kontinuirano izboljšanje kakovosti storitve po oskrbovalni 
verigi navzgor in navzdol. V članku so predstavljene glavne 
značilnosti na kakovost storitve orientiranega upravljanja os-
krbovalnih verig. Kriterij kakovosti storitve, vključen v adap-
tivni model oskrbovalne verige, oskrbuje tržne regulatorje 
The third scenario (see Table 1) presents a mixed 
market with many market regulators, high inspection 
frequency and high fines for distrustful operation. 
From the results we can deduce that around 89% of 
our market has reached at least the average QoS of 
73%. The probability of ending up with a fully regulated 
market in this case was 0.9. In Figures 3a and 3b we 
can observe the combined effect of increasing fines 
and inspection ratios in relation to the previous sce-
nario. Comparing Figures 2a and 2b with Figures 3a and 
3b we can see that both the QoS and QR values in this 
scenario are considerably higher. 
The fourth scenario (see Table 1) presents a mixed 
market with few market regulators, high inspection 
frequency and low fines for distrustful operation. From 
the results we can deduce that around 85% of our 
market has reached at least the average QoS of 73%. 
The probability of ending up with a fully regulated mar-
ket in this case was 0,7. Comparing Figures 3a and 3b 
with Figures 4a and 4b we can see that the effect of 
reducing the number of inspectors and lowering fines 
in this scenario did not have a significant effect on QoS 
and QR values.
QoS impact on the market is substantial. The pro-
ducers as well as retailers are striving to strengthen 
their position in the market. With every transaction they 
are updating their QoS, which can lead them to a stra-
tegic decision to change their current contract status 
in case they discover that their profits would increase 
with the status change. Their decision depends on 
the threshold that is affected by their experience and 
QoS values. With every transaction resulting in their 
positive/negative experience their QoS is increased 
or decreased accordingly and also affects their future 
behaviour. In case their profit is above/below average 
profits of their neighbours and their threshold is low, 
their contract status may change. 
The results show that in all scenarios there is an 
initial “warmup” period of some 30 transactions when 
QoS grows from its minimum to its average value. Af-
ter that it does not change much. Hence, we may con-
clude that QoS stabilizes our market. 
Qualified rate represents a share of business part-
ners whose QoS is above average QoS. During the 
growth of QoS the qualified rate’s oscillations are high, 
since the model has not yet reached a stable state 
and one cannot rely on the obtained QR results. Once 
QoS reaches its average value, however, the qualified 
rate also reaches a certain value and its oscillations 
are lower. The remaining oscillations are mostly as-
sociated with partners changing their contract status 
and hence increasing or decreasing their exposure 
on the market. On a fully regulated market one would 
expect the QoS and QR rates to be close to 1, since 
all partners are considered as trustful. However, since 
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in uprave s potrebnimi informacijami in povratnimi infor-
macijami ob sprejemanju vedno bolj informiranih odločitev. 
Z eksperimentom, ki vsebuje več tipičnih scenarijev, smo z 
našim simulacijskim modelom na osnovi simulacije agentov 
lahko empirično verificirali pričakovani vpliv odločanja na os-
novi kakovosti storitve na generične adaptivne oskrbovalne 
verige.
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